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Richard N. Swiftt
The early years of a new Secretary-General's term' is a good time to
think about the man and the office and to look at these three excellent
contributions to the growing library of books dealing with the SecretaryGeneral.2 The office is a fascinating one, largely because it is, as all
these authors realize, so much a creation of the person who fills it.
Neither the League of Nations Covenant nor the United Nations
Charter tells us much about the post. "The [League] Secretariat
shall comprise a Secretary-General and such secretaries and staff as
may be required," the Covenant states, adding rather mysteriously
that "[t]he Secretary-General shall act in that capacity at all meetings of the Assembly and of the Council."' That tapacityl What
capacity? Despite the sanction for the title Secr~taire-G~niralin
French diplomatic practice, few could have answered at the time.
The job was seen as exclusively administrative, however, and, except
for a brief flirtation with the notion of creating a "chancellor of the
League,"' 1 no one intended "that the Secretary-General should be an
aggressive character, a statesman or leader." 5
t Professor of Politics, New York University. A.B. 1943, A.M. 1948, Phi). 1949,
Harvard University.
1On the recommendation of the Security Council, the General Assembly on December 22, 1971, appointed Kurt Waldheim as its fourth Secretary-General for a five-year
term, which began on January 1, 1972.
2 J. BAnRos, BETEAYAL sRom WTnnN (1969) [hereinafter cited as BARnos] and A.
RovINE, THE FIRST FiFTY YEARs: THE SECRETARY-GENERAL 3N WORLD PoraTcs, 19201970 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Rovnrml have excellent bibliographies. The notes in L.
GoRDENxER, THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL AND THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE (1967) [hereinafter cited as GORDENEER] contain useful bibliographical references. Special reference
should perhaps be made here to the continuing value of S. SCHWEBEL, TE SECRETARYGENERAL or THE UNITED NATIONS (1952). B. URQuHART, HAmwAKsxj6LD (1973) appeared
too late to be reviewed here.
3LEAGum or NATIONS COVENANT art. 6, paras. 1, 4.
4 GORDENEE, supra note 2, at 5.
5C. EAcLETON, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNmENT 263-64 (3d ed. 1957).
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Although the U.N. Charter is a "modernized model" of the Covenant, to use Gordenker's phrase,6 and although, as he points out, the
Preparatory Commission of the U.N. Conference on International Organization devoted a great deal of attention to the Secretariat,7 the
Charter tells us little more than the Covenant about the office. "The
Secretariat shall comprise a Secretary-General and such staff as the Organization may require. The Secretary-General ... shall be the chief
administrative officer of the Organization."' The Charter, like the
Covenant, speaks of the Secretary-General acting "in that capacity," 9
but it goes beyond the Covenant in authorizing the Secretary-General
to "perform such other functions as are entrusted to him" by other
U.N. organs."0 Even more important, it permits him (under Article
99) to "bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter
which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international
peace and security." The origin of this "special right," as the Preparatory Commission called it," lay in the "widespread criticism of the
League system, which had allowed only a member state to bring an
alleged threat before the Council and thus had hampered its speedy
convening to deal with a threat to peace."' 2 But it is a limited grant
of power, as Gordenker makes clear,'" for even if the SecretaryGeneral uses it, he
commits the members of the [Security] Council to nothing.
They may or may not agree even with his assessment of a
matter as bearing on the maintenance of peace. He may send
documents to the Council, speak before it, intervene in its
discussions, and hold confidential consultations. But he14can
neither vote in favor of, nor veto, a resolution before it.
The reluctance of Secretaries-General to use the power unless assured
of a positive response-note how neither U Thant nor Kurt Waldheim invoked it in regard to Vietnam-shows that incumbents have
been aware of the realistic political limitations of their position. On
the other hand, Gordenker's discussion of the single explicit use of
Article 99 by Dag Hammarskild, in calling the crisis in the Congo
to the attention of the Security Council,' 5 and of its two implicit
0 Cf. GORDENKER, supra note 2, at 16-33.
7 See id. 27-33.
8 U.N. CHArTER art. 97.
91d. art. 98.
'l Id.
11 U.N. Preparatory Comm'n, Report, U.N. Doc. PC/20, at 87 (1945) ; cf. GoRDENER,
supra note 2, at 137-58.
12 R. RUSSELL, A HISTORY oF THE UNITE

NATIONS CHARTER 432 (1958); accord,

L. GoODRICn, E. HA-A Ro & A. SIuONS, CHARTER op THE UNITED NATIONS 573 (3d &
rev. ed. 1969).
13 GORDmNER, supra note 2, at 137-58.
14 Id. 331.

Id.
165

139-43. Trygve Lie claimed that he had used Article 99 in the Korean case,
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uses'0 effectively demonstrates that the mere existence of the "special
right" heightens the impact of the Secretary-General's intervention.
The wider powers of the U.N. Secretary-General owe much to the
positive example set by the first head of the League of Nations, Sir
Eric Drummond, who was careful to emphasize the administrative
nature of his position. Nonetheless, as Rovine and Gordenker clearly
demonstrate,'1 8 Sir Eric was able during his term of office (19201933), to play an important part in world diplomacy. His political
acumen, his close attention to international developments, his integrity,
the confidence that national statesmen had in him, and his place at the
center of much diplomatic traffic-all combined to permit him to
exercise a quiet, but decisive influence on international affairs.
Of course, even administration has its political hazards, 9 and
no formal grant of powers can make up for a Secretary-General's
stupidity or knavishness. Barros' sad, but obvious duty has been to
demonstrate that proposition. He gives us an astonishing and gripping
account of Joseph Avenol, second Secretary-General of the League,
whose limited perceptions, sympathy with the fascist and Nazi "new
order," and aversion to "Bolshevism" led from 1933 to 1940 to the
"betrayal from within." No longer can it be said, as Gordenker did
in 1967, that "the final chapter of Avenol's incumbency remains somewhat murky,"20 for Barros has directed a spotlight upon it. He has
steeped himself in all the available documents in the League Archives
at Geneva and in the several foreign offices; he has familiarized himself with the memoirs of the time; and he has interviewed everyone
he could find who participated in the critical events of the late thirties.
The result is a scholarly, impassioned account of Avenol's grievous
failures to understand what really was at stake as he helped preside
over the successive sacrificial offerings of Ethiopia, Danzig, the Rhineland, and Czechoslovakia on the altar of appeasement. We have here
a masterful portrait of an international villain, rushing off to Italy
in futile efforts to save the League of Nations by throwing Ethiopia
to the contemporary Roman legions, and ultimately prepared to dismantle the entire League apparatus if, by doing so, he could ingratiate
himself with P~tain in Vichy France and Hitler in Berlin.
Most of the large events that loom in the background of Barros'
canvas will be familiar to his readers-in fact, he assumes some
familiarity with the times-but it is a great tribute to him that, especially as he writes on "Defeat in the West" and on "Avenol's
but that claim is not in fact borne out by the U.N. offidal records. Compare 5 U.N.
SCOR, 473d meeting 1-3 (1950), with T. LrE, IN ntm CAUSE Or PEACE 328 (1954).
16 GORDENRER, supra note 2, at 143-47.
17 Id. 146.
18See id. 6-10; RovN, supra note 2, at 17-103.
19 See GORDENKER, supra note 2, at 90-119.
20

Id. 11.
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Resignation," we feel caught up in "Gtterd~immerung." The book
at this point, as they say about all great thrillers, is hard to put
down, perhaps because it comes through so clearly as a clash between
"good" and "evil." On the one hand, as requested by Vichy France,
Avenol is abandoning his post, but trying to retain some authority
over the League; on the other hand, heroic men like the "diminutive
and shy" 21 Sean Lester and his colleague, Thanassis Aghnides, were
determined, if at all possible, to save the vestige of an independent
League for the post-war world.
To Lester, who eventually succeeded Avenol, and whose hitherto
unpublished diary Barros puts to such effective use, Avenol appeared
in 1940 to be
plotting for the enemies of his country before an offer to lay
down arms was accepted; he had plans to please them before
the blood of his massacred countrymen was cold; he spoke
with complacency of a new state when the glory of the old
was being mangled under the tanks of the invaders; he conspired to betray the trust placed on him and to corrupt the
honour of his associates in a debased self-interest. A pompous
self-opinionated creature when relieved of fears for his person
and his belongings. 2
Lester's own tribute to Agbnides, which Barros quotes from a copy
of a letter in the League Archives, is a quiet, moving, and compelling
encomium to both men:
I cannot omit mentioning the special service you rendered
to the League at the most dangerous crisis which has faced
the Secretariat since its beginning. I say 'service to the
League' but the English poet expressed it better-that one
who to his own self be true cannot then be false to any
man.... One man does not say to another man: you have
conducted yourself as a man of honour-that is the privilege
of Kings. But there is always some bond between two comrades who stood quietly side by side at a time when the
horizon and the future were dark and uncertain and when
there was only one guide to conduct, the simple one of duty.'
These indeed are heady materials, and this portion of Barros' book
will long endure for its vivid account of the impact of personality
upon international organization. 24
What Barros has to say of Avenol is generally confirmed by
Rovine, who presents us with a single chapter on each of the League
21

22
23

RovNE, supra note 2, at 173.

Lester Diary 478, in BARRos, supra note 2, at 233.
Letter from Sean Lester to Thanassis Aghnides, Apr. 22, 1944, in BARRos, supra

note 2, at 244-45.
24 For another, see E. PHELAx, YES

AND ALBERT THoMAs

(1949).
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and U.N. Secretaries-General. Rovine draws on published materials and,
in the case of the League, on League Archives, on the papers of
Raymond B. Fosdick (who planned originally to collaborate on this
work), and on various national records, particularly on the National
Archives of the United States. Rovine presents his historical material
clearly and economically in well-written, comprehensive, and interesting chapters exemplifying Carlyle's dictum that history is the essence
of innumerable biographies. 5 His theoretical chapter on the "SecretaryGeneral in World Politics" is, however, somewhat self-conscious and
arid-less Rovine's fault, perhaps, than the failure of political science
to give us any really illuminating theories, even at the "middle level
of abstraction" Rovine aims for.2 6
In this final chapter, in any case, Rovine tells us that "the most
critical asset at the disposal of the Secretary-General is his neutrality,")27 although he quickly points out that neutrality is not the right

word to use in the sense of "a simple posture between two antagonists,12 8 because adhering to the Charter does not always permit
neutrality in this sense. When a state challenges the principles of the
Charter, the Secretary-General must defend them-even at the cost
of his acceptability to the great powers who are his most influential,
if not his most important, clients 29 Impartiality in applying the Charter's principles is probably far more important, as Rovine recognizes
elsewhere.0 Rovine also pays due deference to the value to the international community of the Secretary-General's diplomatic skills and
access to political information. And he discusses the importance both
of the Secretary-General's role as international rule-maker and also
of his symbolic position as head of a general international organization who can confer legitimacy upon international postures.3 1
Although Rovine looks at a wider range of international experience than does Gordenker and has the advantage of several years'
25 9 T. CARLYLE, Biography in
26 RovIN, supra note 2, at 415.
2
7 Id. 416.
28 Id.

COLLECTED WORKS

3, 6 (1839-69).

29

The issue was joined by Hammarskj5ld in a statement to the General Assembly
on October 3, 1960, when he stated:
It is not the Soviet Union or, indeed, any other big Powers who need the United
Nations for their protection; it is all the others. In this sense the Organization is
first of all their Organization, and I deeply believe in the wisdom with which
they will be able to use it and guide it. I shall remain in my post during the
term of my office as a servant of the Organization in the interests of all those
other nations, as long as they wish me to do so.
D. EALU RSKJLD, SERVANT OF PEACE 319 (1962). On the other hand, all five permanent

members of the Security Council must agree when they nominate a candidate for
Secretary-General for the General Assembly to approve. See U.N. CARTR art. 27. See
also GORDENKER, supra note 2, at 34-63.
30 RovIN, supra note 2, at 417-18.
31 See R. HIGGINS, TE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH TE P0LITICAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS (1963); Claude, Collective Legititnization as a
Political Function of the United Nations, 20 INT'z. ORG. 367 (1966).
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additional perspective, Gordenker's final assessment is just as informative and far more readable. He draws on the concept of influence,
as Richard Neustadt did in his Presidential Power,2 and he writes
with enviable clarity and grace. It is hard to improve on his proposition that "the Secretary-General can act within narrow but undefined
and shifting limits, and [that] his independent actions influence the
course of international politics but never at a constant level."3 3 He
points out that Kurt Waldheim's predecessors have all believed that
the U.N. has a significant role to play in world politics; have been
convinced that the Secretary-General has an important place in developing policies to help maintain international peace and security; and
have insisted that the office should be politically independent and international in outlook 4 Gordenker's final chapter about the SecretaryGeneralship is, in fact, a fitting companion piece to Dag Hammarskjild's own lectures on The International Civil Service in Law and
in FactY5 Gordenker sums up the political and institutional assets
and liabilities of the Secretary-General, including the "personal intelligence, ingenuity, tact, courage, and stamina"l required to succeed
in the "besieged and lonely" office 3 6
On the importance of great personal qualities in a SecretaryGeneral, all our authors agree. Where they part company and where
they raise the most controversial questions is in the way they define
the proper constitutional role of the Secretary-General. Barros looks
back at the tragic story he has told us of Avenol and concludes, in
his brief final chapter on "Implications for the Office of SecretaryGeneral," that Avenol's melancholy story proves that "[t]he belief
in a politically active Secretary-General... appears to rest on a form
of escapism. It is fundamentally an attempt to circumvent the fact
that . . . the office of Secretary-General can be a disruptive and
disquieting influence in the international community.' 37 He adds that:
As long as the world community is founded on the nationstate system . . . the office of Secretary-General, though it
can, in the right hands, sometimes play an important role
in maintaining the peace, can also, in the wrong hands, play
a dangerous role in exacerbating the tensions of the world
community....
Since the office is by its very nature political, the
Secretary-General should be restrained or controlled in his
actions as much as possible 3
32 p. NEUsTADT, PRESiENTIAL POWER (1960).

83 GoaRxiER, supra note 2, at xiii.
341d.

84-85.

3

5 Published in 1961.
36 GoRmxxR, supra note 2, at 328, 335.
37 BARos, supra note 2, at 264.
381d. 264-65.
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"[I]nternational politics," he quips at the end, "is too serious a matter
30
to be left to the Secretaries-General."
What Barros says here is true, of course, but only partly true.
The whole truth is that international politics is too serious a matter
to be left to national leaders as well. Certainly the challenges of the
1930's were far too much for Neville Chamberlain and Edouard
Daladier. Their contributions to the debacle of 1939, to say nothing
of those of Hitler and Mussolini, were far greater than Avenol's.
Barros warns us that a poor Secretary-General, another Avenol, could
in times of crisis be an international disaster. His point is well taken,
and one can sympathize with his pessimism after recreating the tragedy
of the years before World War II. But even he has earlier wondered:
what would have happened if Avenol had shown the same
imagination, initiative, and skill in prodding the British and
French to maintain the status quo in Europe as he did in
expelling the Soviet Union from the League or in undermining the legal and moral position of the Ethiopian government. Is it conceivable [he asks] that Germany would have
been less free to destroy European and world peace?4"
His implied answer is yes, and that is also the answer provided in the
larger record presented by Rovine and by Gordenker. They show us
that, except for Avenol, the Secretaries-General have been- constructive forces in world politics even when, in some cases, they may have
acted somewhat ultra vires. One need only recall that Sir Eric established the principle of an international civil service; that Sean
Lester kept the League idea alive; that Trygve Lie gave a vigorous
start to the UN and showed its potential for collective security in
Korea; that Dag Hammarskj6ld developed the constitutional theory
of the Secretary-General, practiced "preventive diplomacy," and increased the capacity of the U.N. for peace-keeping; and that U Thant
conserved Hammarskjbld's gains under far greater constraints, significantly helped resolve the West Irian dispute, offered face-saving
formulae to dissipate the Cuban missile crisis, helped to get peace
talks started in Vietnam, pressed for admitting the People's Republic
of China to the U.N., and promoted international concern for the environment. Even Avenol must receive credit for setting in motion
the plans that eventuated in states demonstrating the much larger
concern for an organized approach to international economic and
social problems that has characterized the world since 1945.41
39 Id. 265.
40 Id. 260. Barros himself points out here that Avenol was not alone in failing to see
that "the danger to the status quo presented by a German-Italian axis could only be
counterbalanced by a British-French-Russian coalition supported by the smaller states
of Europe," for fear of the Left was also the dominant passion of British and French
leadership.
41
Avenol asked the League of Nations Council to establish a committee to study the
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Politics may well deny us the "perfect" Secretary-General.
Gordenker's chapter on "The Appointment Process" shows us why
and how "each appointment of a Secretary-General provides an occasion to define that office." 4 States, no doubt, get the SecretaryGeneral they deserve. No doubt, too, Secretaries-General other than
Avenol have made mistakes: Trygve Lie in identifying too closely
with the United States, Dag Hammarskj~ild in failing to protect himself adequately from charges that he was moving beyond his mandate,
U Thant for withdrawing the U.N. Emergency Force so precipitately
from Gaza in 1967. 4 ' But which national statesmen have not made
mistakes? And would we, on balance, be better off without the
Secretaries-General or their annual reports? As Gordenker points out,
the reports on the work of the organization are instruments of public
relations; 44 they are far more likely to take an impartial view of
international problems and to serve the cause of international peace
and security than national reports dealing with the same subjects.4 '
Moreover, they have still unrealized potential as reports on the state
of the world.
Gordenker, as he looks to the future, reminds us that "[e]ven
though the Secretary-General influences the decision-making organs
in various ways, he does not in the final analysis make decisions for
governments," 46 and cautiously concludes that "whatever the future
of the United Nations brings, the office of Secretary-General can be
expected to influence the work of the organization.1141 Rovine is more
sanguine and professes to see a trend toward expanding the capabilities
of the office of Secretary-General and a consequent trend toward
4
"the slow development of a cooperative system of world order." 1
He offers us some suggestions by drawing on recent proposals for
giving the Secretary-General greater military and strategic expertise.4 9
Certainly, it is in matters of peace-keeping and peace-making that
League's organizational problems pertaining to the "technical realm." The Committee,
established May 27, 1939, was chaired by Stanley Bruce (Australia), and the "Bruce
Committee" report was a harbinger of the specialized agencies and of the Economic and
Social Council of the United Nations. BARuos, supra note 2, at 194-95.
42 GoRDENxER, supra note 2, at 62.
43 Writing before U Thant withdrew the UNEF, Gordenker says, with foresight, "In
general, the Secretary-General will have a great influence on deciding when a peace-keeping mission is to be ended if there is general agreement that much of his mandate has
been fulfilled. If there is no such agreement, it is unlikely that he would suggest dissolving a peace-keeping force since to do so would tend to aggravate existing conflicts." Id.
284. See also id. 254.
44 Id. 123.
45 Cf. U.S. DEP'T or STATE, FOREGN POLICy Or TEM UNIT=D STATES 1970; U.S.
DEP'T or STATE, FoREIGN POLICY or THE UNITED STATES 1971.
46 GORDENKER, supra note 2, at 330.
4

71d. 336.

48
49

RoViNE,

supra note 2, at 463.

See 0. YOUNG, THE INTEIrIEDmARIEs: THIRD PARTIES 3
(1967). See also L. FABIAN, SOLDIERS WITHOUT ENEMIES (1971).

INTERNATIONAL CRIsEs
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the Secretary-General has proved most vulnerable. The member states
too often leave the Secretary-General in an exposed position because
they themselves are unable to unite on an approach to a problem.
Even so, Mr. Hammarskjbld and U Thant did not hesitate to criticize
national policies when they seemed to run counter to states' treaty
obligations under the Charter, and Dr. Waldheim has begun to do
the same. The Secretaries-General cannot act as the world's scourge
without limit, however, and all these authors help to tell us why.
Perhaps, though, in the not too distant future, states will acknowledge the value of the Secretary-General's Office and make it a more
effective agent of international peace and security-not only for the
sake of the United Nations, but also in their own national interests.
An impartial Secretary-General "above the battle" is too important to
the modern world to deny him the institutional props he needs. Hammarskjbld's use of an ad hoc Advisory Committee for the Congo5" was
a personal answer to the problem of getting political advice, but it did
not include all the parties concerned and proved inadequate to the
situation. The U.N. still needs to explore the value of standing advisory
committees for the Secretary-General. The members could be members
of permanent U.N. missions, respected individuals elected by the Assembly to special advisory boards, or members of advisory commissions,
whom the Secretary-General could nominate and the Assembly confirm.
All these devices could offer the Secretary-General the advantage
of wider perspectives than he can now command.51 International peace
and security would be enhanced even more, however, if states could
see their way clear to give the Secretary-General his own political
arms-perhaps a U.N. diplomatic service which could provide him with
as much information and diplomatic support as the diplomatic service of
a small- or middle-sized power. A Secretary-General with fifteen representatives at large, serving in major capitals and in selected trouble
spots around the world, with a policy planning council in the Office of
the Under Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs to which these
representatives could report and where their reports would provide an
intelligence base for the Secretary-General, would go a long way to
strengthen the United Nations as an instrument of diplomacy. The
cost would not be large-in fact, as a kind of insurance policy against
some of the risks of war, it would amount to no more than a prudent
investment.
Too much today is left to the accident that successive SecretariesGeneral may be skilled diplomatists. Not all of them, however, will
5oThe Secretary-General invited the permanent representatives of the states with
forces in the Congo to serve on the Committee: Canada, Ceylon, Ethiopia, Federation of
Malaya, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Liberia, Mali, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Senegal, Sudan, Sweden, Tunisia, and the United Arab Republic. YEARBOOK. OTF
UNITED NATIONS 713 (1961). See also GoRnENxx,
supra note 2, at 291-96.
51
See also Swift, The Secretarial, in NEW DiraENSIONS FOR THE UNITED NATIoNs:
THE PROBLEMS OF THE NExT DECADE 189 (1966).
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have the talents of Sir Eric or of Dag Hammarskj~ild, and the office
needs institutional arms to sustain and enhance it. Such institutional
changes would recognize the actual and potential value of the United
Nations as a "third party" in international disputes and would do
much to guarantee that the dialogue between the United Nations and
world policy-makers was as fruitful as possible.
Even without these admittedly optimistic developments, the
Secretary-General remains a useful and independent judge of the policies of nations. Given the tenacity of our present international system,52 the inherent potentials in the office of Secretary-General may
not develop, and we shall have to content ourselves with what we have.
But the lesson to be learned from Gordenker's survey of the SecretaryGeneral's role in maintaining international peace and security, from
Barros' account of Joseph Avenol's "betrayal," and from Rovine's
survey of "the first fifty years," is that if we come to a time when
the voice of the Secretary-General is either not heard in the land or
heard only in harmony with the great powers, the next fifty years
will be but hollow echoes of the last.
= AToeC AGE (1959); Herz, The
52 See J. Lz,Z INTERATIONAL, Porrrics 3w
Territorial State Revisited, 1 PoLITT

12 (1968).

HARMONIZATION OF EUROPEAN COMPANY LAWS: NATIONAL REFORM AND TRANSNATIONAL COORDINATION. BY ERIc STEIN. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1971. Pp.
lxii, 558. $22.50.
P. John Kozyrist
After the Second World War, it became evident to Europeans
that in order to prosper economically in the face of the two emergent
outside superpowers, it was imperative that Western Europe integrate.
The European Economic Community (EEC), which came into being by treaty1 in 1958, was conceived as the main instrument for the
realization of this aspiration on a gradual basis, starting with a customs union, proceeding with economic unification and ending with
some form of political integration. At the heart of the new European
economic system was the elimination of state frontiers as barriers to
the movement of people, products and resources. Since a large and
increasing, segment of economic activity is carried out by corporations, their mobility appeared of obvious importance for the creation
of a single market.
Professor Stein's book outlines the problems and describes, in a
highly readable account, both what has already been done and what
remains to be accomplished in the process of integrating the European
corporate scene. As a bonus and useful background, Stein also briefs
us on recent progress in reforming and organizing the corporate law
of the individual EEC member states. The merits of the book are
many and weighty. Stein's multilingual ability, versatility in the comparative method, knowledge of the European systems, and understanding of the settings in which the issues are posed, uniquely
qualify him to perform the formidable task of integrating, rather than
cumulating, these extensive and disparate materials. Not oniy is the
book a treasury of information, compactly and stylishly presented,
on both national and European corporate law; but it also contains
fascinating accounts of how the new European institutions work, the
pressures they generate, and the counterpressures that develop from
national sources. If there is one weakness in the book, it exists only
from the point of view of a teacher of corporations whose appetite
has been whetted: because of its wide scope, there is no room for
detailed analysis of specific provisions or institutions of European
corporate law and for comparison with their American counterparts.
t Professor of Law, Ohio State University. Law Diploma 1954, University of Thes-

salonki, Greece; M. Comp. L. 1955, University of Chicago, Diplome de Droit Compar6
1958, International University of Comparative Law, Luxembourg; J.D. 1960, Cornell
University. Member, New York and Ohio Bars.
'Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, 298 U.N.T.S. 11.
940

BOOK REVIEWS

It goes without saying that corporations located in Europe have
been the major beneficiaries of the liberalization of intra-community
trade which culminated in 1969. Another phase of the integration
process directly of concern to corporations has been the development
of freedom of establishment; that is, the freedom of a corporation of
one member state not merely to export into others, but also to directly set up production and distribution operations (through branches
and agencies or by means of the formation or acquisition of subsidiaries) in other member states on non-discriminatory terms. Articles
52, 54 and 58 of the original Treaty make it clear that companies
established in one member state and having their registered office,
central administration or principal place of business within the Community, are to have such rights of establishment. The existing restrictions on corporate freedom of establishment were gradually eliminated
under two general programs drawn up by the EEC Council in 1961,
and the introduction of new restrictions is prohibited by article 53.
In the past, one of the principal formal obstacles to the mobility
of European corporations has been the conflict of laws rule which
subjects a corporation, as to its formation, continued existence, and
internal affairs, to the law of the place of its "real seat," that is,
the location of its central management. As a consequence, a corporation whose real seat was found to be in a state other than that of its
incorporation would risk, for example, involuntary dissolution and
liquidation. This rule appears inconsistent with a full right of establishment. Whether or not it was accordingly rendered pro tanto
inapplicable by the Treaty, a new Convention on the Mutual Recognition of Companies and Legal Persons dealing with some aspects
of this problem was signed in 1968 by the member states, pursuant
to article 220. The Convention provides in essence that a corporation
organized in one member state must be recognized in the others, at
least if its real seat is somewhere within the Community or if it
otherwise maintains a genuine link with the economy of a member
state.
As noted by Stein, the impact of European integration upon corporate matters does not end with the freedom of establishment. In
fact, the Treaty contains provisions regarding coordination and approximation of national company laws in certain contexts as well as
the facilitation of inter-European mergers. To begin with, article
54(3) (g) mandates the coordination, with a view toward equivalence,
of national protection for the rights of corporate shareholders and
creditors. While the initial impulse for this Community action appears
to have been a desire to provide minimum guarantees to member
states in exchange for their agreeing to allow unlimited freedom of
corporate establishment, the resultant coordination is bound to facilitate significantly the creation of Community-wide capital markets
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and to affect the rights of security holders irrespective of establishment, as well. On the basis of article 54(3) (g), a First Directive
was approved by the EEC Council in 1968 which dealt with corporate
disclosures, the ultra vires doctrine, and nullities for failure to meet
incorporation requirements. Stein devotes a significant portion of his
book to a behind-the-scenes exploration of the long and controversial
gestation process of this Directive, followed by a discussion of its
provisions in considerable detail. During 1970-71, the Commission prepared and submitted to the Council for approval, three new directives under article 54(3) (g), dealing respectively with corporate
capitalization (disclosure, maintenance and changes), internal mergers and consolidations, and the form and content of annual statements.
The question of mergers is a further complication, and Stein
addresses it ably. In part as a response to the so-called "American
Challenge," Europeans are willing to encourage corporate concentration for the purposes of taking advantage of economies of scale, improving management efficiency and technological development, and
facilitating financing. National laws, however, do not provide for interEuropean mergers, with the result that corporate acquisitions across
frontier lines encounter almost insurmountable tax and technical barriers. Article 220 of the Treaty envisages a separate convention for
inter-European mergers, however; and the preparatory work for such
a convention, as well as that for a convention on the transfer of
corporate seat without loss of legal personality, is already in progress.
Partly due to the difficulties encountered with inter-European
mergers which could not be resolved through a harmonization convention, and partly because of the appeal of the concept itself, the EEC
Commission put forward in 1970 a proposal advocating adoption of
a Community statute for a new form of European company. Although
much creative and comparative legal analysis went into the preparation of this federal-type statute, access to the new form is to be
severely limited. By the terms of the statute only companies from
different member states can be founders of a European company, and
then only for purposes of merger or the formation of a holding company or a joint subsidiary; there is no possibility of transforming a
national company as such into a European one.
However successful may be the campaign to remove legal roadblocks to corporate establishment across state borders and to make the
laws governing corporations responsive to the needs of inter-European
enterprise, little real progress will be made in practice as long as the
tax systems of the member states are significantly different. Recognizing that income tax laws and practices directly affect the establishment
and operation of the Common Market, and fixing their sights upon
maximum tax neutrality, the EEC authorities commissioned a working
party to study the direct taxation of company income in the member
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states and to report on areas where equalization pursuant to article 100
of the Treaty might be desirable. The working party completed its
task and prepared a detailed report. In the meantime, some other progress has been made, and a great deal is yet in store in this field. In
1965, the Council adopted a directive for the harmonization of issue
and transfer taxes on securities also imposing maximum limitations.
In 1969, the Commission laid before the Council2 a memorandum dealing with measures for adjusting direct taxes on corporate dividends
and interest, especially withholding taxes, for the purpose of avoiding
double taxation. In the same year, the Commission submitted to the
Council two draft directives for the establishment of a common tax
system for mergers and for parents and subsidiaries, permitting, in
particular, tax-free reorganizations and consolidation of income across
state frontiers. In addition, the draft statute for the European company
contains elaborate provisions on the taxation of corporate income.
From the point of view of the American corporation already operating or intending to establish operations in Europe, the effort to coordinate and harmonize the national corporate and tax legislation and
to facilitate the growth of inter-European enterprises is a mixed blessing. To the extent that uniformity tends to establish minimum standards and regulations more stringent than those previously existing,
without limiting the freedom of the states to impose additional regulation (as has often been the case), the changes may not be beneficial.
Furthermore, European industrial concentration is likely to present a
greater challenge to its American competitors. On the other hand, the
stricter standards apply to the competition as well, and the consolidation and coordination of the European operations of American enterprises is also facilitated. What is of greater concern to the American
corporation is the pressure from some quarters, especially France, for
the exclusion from most of the benefits available to Community companies, of foreign-controlled corporations established in Europe, a pressure particularly directed against American subsidiaries. Stein recounts
a number of instances where this attitude has surfaced; but it has not
been able to progress very far, and it appears that in the end the
corporate veil will not be pierced for this purpose. What is likely to
emerge, however, in part as a concession to this effort, is a Community
policy on foreign investment.
As a teacher of American corporate law with comparative law
interests, I was particularly attracted by the glimpses provided by
Stein's book into present-day European thinking on the major corporation law issues. It is rather disappointing that the recent reforms and
movements for reform in Europe, with the partial exception of Germany, are traditionally oriented and aim mostly at the codification
and classification of existing law rather than at implementation of sub2

As to the relative functions of the Commission and Council, see id. §§ 4, 7, 145-63.
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stantive changes in light of modern corporate realities. For example,
the conception of the corporation as a contract still haunts the formation of corporations with requirements of minimum numbers of shareholders and the resulting corporate nullities. Inordinate attention is
still focused on the existence and maintenance of minimum formal
capitalization for stock companies, as if it were the most significant
indication of the worth of a going concern. (One must concede, however, that the Europeans have thus managed to avoid the special problems of initial undercapitalization which have led some American
courts to overstretch the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil.) At
the management level, the division of functions between a supervisory
board and an executive directorate, which is becoming fashionable in
Europe, is aimed not only at efficiency but also at the reinforcement of
shareholder power at a time when, at least in the context of the large
and mature corporation, this appears to be a lost cause.
One area where significant reform is taking place, however, both
at the national and the European levels, is that of corporate reporting
and disclosure, improving considerably the protection of security holders as investors. Probably the most intriguing feature of continental
corporate law is illustrated by the German provisions which in effect
pierce the corporate veil between parent, subsidiary and affiliated corporations and treat them as one entity in certain contexts in order to
benefit shareholders (principally) and creditors (secondarily) of the
controlled corporations. In America, comparable, though less comprehensive, results are often reached on equitable grounds, for example
through the alter ego theory and the imposition of fiduciary obligations
upon majority shareholders. Additionally, in considering the concept
of co-determination developed in Germany for the participation of
worker representatives in management policy-making, a concept which
has been well received at the Community level despite the mixed
German experience, one is reminded of the recent debates among corporate theoreticians in America on the need to make the corporation
socially responsible and responsive to such constituencies as its employees, suppliers, distributors and, ultimately, customers.
In his admirable book, Professor Stein discusses, illuminates and
updates most of the topics touched upon in this review, and anyone
with an interest in European corporate developments who misses it will
be depriving himself not only of a great wealth of information but also
of the pleasure of reading a work well written.
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